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Abstract
Turkey began to receive refugees from Syria in 2011 and has since become the country hosting the highest number of
refugees, with more than 3.5 million Syrians and half a million people of other nationalities, mainly from Afghanistan, Iraq
and Iran. An important turning point regarding the legal status of Syrian refugees has come with recent amendments to
the Turkish citizenship law. Based on ongoing academic debates on integration and citizenship, this article will explore
these two concepts in the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey. We will argue that the shift in the Turkish citizenship law
is a direct outcome of recent migration flows. We further argue that the citizenship option is used both as a reward for
skilled migrants with economic and cultural capital and as a tool to integrate the rest of the Syrians. It also reflects other
social, political and demographic concerns of the Turkish government. Using our recent ethnographic study with Syrians
and local populations in twomain refugee hosting cities in Turkey, Istanbul and Gaziantep, we will locate the successes and
weaknesses of this strategy by exemplifying the views of Syrian refugees on gaining Turkish citizenship and the reactions
of Turkish nationals.
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1. Introduction
In 2011, Turkey started to receive refugees from Syria
fleeing the eruption of violence. Since then, the civil
war has escalated in Syria, and Turkey has become the
country hosting the highest number of refugees in the
world. According to the Directorate General of Migra-
tion Management of Turkey (DGMM), the number of
Syrian refugees under temporary protection settled in
Turkey stands at more than 3.5 million as of Febru-
ary 2018.1 Obviously, there are political, economic, de-
mographic and socio-cultural implications of this mass
movement for the wider society and for the refugees
themselves. Yet, two important factors are usually over-
looked in these flows and missing in mere statistics
available on Syrian refugees. The first one is about
the diversity of the Syrian population in Turkey, since
they come from different socio-economic, ethnic and
religious backgrounds. The second point has to do
with their legal status. Turkey adopted a new Law on
Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) in 2013
(Law No. 6458) and additional legislation in 2014 that
1 Excluding the number of unregistered and those living with residence permits, the number of Syrian refugees under temporary protection in Turkey
reached 3,531,416 as of February 2018. Themajority of Syrians live in urban centers and only 8% live in camps. See recent statistics on the demographics
of Syrians under temporary protection in cities and camps at DGMM (2018).
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changed their legal status from temporary guests to
those under temporary protection.2
Althoughmany Syrians enjoy certain rights under the
temporary protection regime, they are still not consid-
ered to be “refugees” due to Turkey’s retention of the
geographical limitation clause in the 1951 Geneva Con-
vention on Refugees.3 There are also thousands of Syr-
ians with residence permits without temporary protec-
tion status and an unknown number of Syrian irregular
migrants.4 Their “liminal” situation and temporary status
not only automatically limit their opportunities, like per-
manent settlement in Turkey, but also hinder the politi-
cal will to put proper integration regimes in place at the
national level even after seven years.
An important turning point regarding the legal sta-
tus of Syrian refugees was the amendment to the citi-
zenship law and the surrounding heated debates on the
naturalization of Syrians. As mentioned earlier, Turkey
has already provided “temporary protection” to Syrian
refugees, which somewhat eased their access to certain
rights, including access to public healthcare, education of
children, and participation in labor markets via the new
law on work permits. The idea of granting Turkish citizen-
ship to Syrians who have found refuge in Turkey was first
voiced in 2016 by President Erdoğan in Kilis, a city near
the border with Syria with pre-existing close kin ties be-
tween Syrians and Turkish nationals (Milliyet, 2016). Kilis
is an interesting case study to consider, as the number
of Syrian refugees has gradually exceeded the number
of local inhabitants and the city has de facto become a
buffer zone between Syria and Turkey. Such public an-
nouncements triggered a debate partly due to the lack
of legal status of Syrians as “refugees” or as “permanent
residents/denizens” in the first place and partly because
they fueled nationalist fears that the temporariness of
Syrians’ stay would be replaced with permanence (Koser
Akcapar, 2018). In order tomitigate the political backlash
and public outrage, government officials clarified that
granting citizenship to Syrians would require they meet
exceptional criteria based on high skill and higher educa-
tion levels of applicants.5
Considering the intricate relationship between inte-
gration and citizenship in the case of refugees, this article
specifically explores the changing concept of citizenship
in Turkey over the years, but especially after the arrival
of Syrian refugees, and evaluates the conditions and ra-
tionale for extending Turkish citizenship to Syrians. In ex-
ploring the linkage between integration and citizenship
in the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey, this article exam-
ines the following questions:Why has the Turkish govern-
ment changed its long-standing citizenship model based
on jus sanguinis (descent or blood principle)? What fac-
tors play crucial roles in the changing nature of citizen-
ship in the Turkish case? What does gaining Turkish cit-
izenship mean for Syrian refugees? How is gaining Turk-
ish citizenship interlinked with the integration of Syrian
refugees? We argue that the main reasons for this shift
in citizenship policy are a direct outcome of mass mi-
gration, particularly Syrian refugee flows. Although Turk-
ish citizenship law seems to have become more inclu-
sive through the amendment, we also argue that the
law remains selective, targeting Syrians with cultural and
economic capital as well as mostly those coming from
a Sunni background. Based on the interrelated citizen-
ship and integration concepts in migration literature and
the changing Turkish citizenship regime, we begin the ar-
ticle by setting out a theoretical framework before out-
lining the research methods implemented for this study.
Using interview data, we then examine the life expe-
riences of Syrian refugees in two main cities, Istanbul
and Gaziantep, and their views on gaining citizenship
in Turkey. As this protracted and mostly urban refugee
problem has also generated problems and tensions with
the local populations, we will also discuss public reac-
tions towards Syrians’ citizenship acquisition. The final
section evaluates the government policies and concludes
with recommendations.
2. Theoretical Framework: Integration and Path to
Citizenship of Refugee Populations
The terms “citizenship” and “integration” have been
used to refer to different stages of immigrants’ settle-
ment in the academic literature. Citizenship expresses
different things to many people (Joppke, 2007, p. 37)
and its meaning varies among nation-states, migrants
and refugees. While for some scholars, citizenship rep-
resents the capstone of integration processes (Ager &
Strang, 2008), for others it is an important means to se-
cure full inclusion in the receiving society (Massey& Bart-
ley, 2005). In general, it is defined as:
A formal legal status that links individuals to a state
or another established polity (such as the Euro-
pean Union or a federal province), a bundle of le-
gal rights and duties associated with the status, in-
cluding civil liberties, rights to democratic representa-
tion, and social rights to education, health care, and
2 On 22 October 2014, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Turkey issued a regulation on temporary protection. The law lists six types of residence
permits: short-term, long-term, family, student, humanitarian, and victims of trafficking. The LFIP also regulates their access to health, education, social
assistance and the labor market. The law was further amended in 2016.
3 Turkey is a signatory of the Geneva Convention on Refugees, but it is one of the few countries retaining the geographical limitation clause lifted in 1967,
which is tied to the long-stalled full membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU and the prevalent fear that Turkey will be given the duty of
safeguarding the external borders of the EU with no or little prospects for international burden-sharing. Although people coming from outside Europe
cannot be given refugee status in Turkey because of political concerns, we have used the term refugee throughout the article.
4 The DGMM reports that there are 65,000 Syrians staying in Turkey with residence permits. Although the number of unregistered Syrians in Turkey
is unknown, the number of Syrians voluntarily leaving Turkey for Syria via the border gates suggests high numbers (interview with UNHCR official in
Gaziantep, Karkamış border gate).
5 See Sözcü daily dated 6 July 2017: http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/yildirimdan-suriyeliler-mesaji-1921618/
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protection from poverty risks, a set of responsibili-
ties, virtues, and practices that support democratic
self-government and a collective identity that can be
shared across distinctions of class, race, gender, reli-
gion, ethnic origin, or way of life. (Bauböck, 2008, p. 3)
It basically refers to who is included or excluded in any
given society in terms of civil, political or economic rights
(Hammar, 1990).
In this day and age, different practices of citizenship
highlight the changing nature of citizenship globally. Ac-
cording to Gardner’s “new citizenship model,” the con-
cept of citizenship has been divorced from that of na-
tionality (quoted in Kibreab, 2003, pp. 44–45). Similarly,
Kymlicka (2003, p. 195) notes that while the idea of “na-
tional citizenship” is becoming obsolete, there is a new
understanding of citizenship that demands rights in re-
turn for responsibilities. The traditional understanding
of citizenship, which refers to a unitary status highlight-
ing a strong sense of belonging to a single nation-state,
is changing due to the emergence of a global economy,
the use of new information technologies, freemovement
of capital and goods, the development of supra-national
institutions, universal norms of governance including hu-
man rights and democracy, and cross-cultural awareness
as byproducts of the process of globalization (Castles &
Davidson, 2000). This is especially evident with the in-
crease in cross-border political, economic, social and cul-
tural relationships of individuals. Reforms of citizenship
law, paving the way for a dual citizenship option, address
the issues exacerbated by globalization and increasing
transnationalism and are currently linked with the chal-
lenges facing the nation-state model at the end of twen-
tieth century (Castles & Davidson, 2000). Soysal calls this
understanding of citizenship “post-national citizenship”
and argues that “the state is no longer an autonomous
and independent organization closed over a nationally
defined population” (1994, pp. 163–164). Instead, what
we have is a system of constitutionally interconnected
states with amultiplicity ofmemberships. Soysal’smodel
of “post-national citizenship” is based on universal hu-
man rights, which highlights the fact that access to rights
is no longer limited by a unitary state-bound citizenship
status but instead locates citizenship and its practices in
transnational understandings that span the borders of
nation-states.
“Transnational citizenship” has been popularized in
the literature to describe a concept of citizenship that
highlights the cross-border activities of individuals. It
can be summarized as “a triangular relationship be-
tween individuals and two or more independent states
in which these individuals are simultaneously assigned
membership status andmembership-based rights or obli-
gations” (Bauböck, 2007, p. 2395). This conceptualiza-
tion highlights that changes in rights to dual citizenship
and institutional transformations of membership and le-
gal rights have occurred due to migration, globalization,
mobility and diversity. Taking the case of Turkish immi-
grants living in Germany, Kaya’s (2012) research illus-
trates that German-Turks construct transnational spaces
where theymeet their political, economic, social and cul-
tural needs and perform citizenship practices that cross
the borders of sending and receiving countries. These
new conceptualizations of citizenship, including “post-
national citizenship,” “dual citizenship” and “transna-
tional citizenship,” express the changing nature of be-
longing and role of nation-states in the practices of cit-
izenship. As the number of international migrants in-
creases, the number of dual citizens and the countries
allowing dual citizenship also increases.
It is important to note that themeaning of citizenship
differs among various types of migrants. For refugees,
for instance, acquiring citizenship is more about human
security, gaining a higher status in the receiving society
and having access to more rights. As pointed out by Ki-
breab, “non-nationals, particularly refugees, are denied
many of the rights enjoyed by nationals and are conse-
quently considered as ‘other,’ removed from the politi-
cal, social, economic and cultural life of host societies”
(2003, p. 47). Therefore, citizenship for refugees is asso-
ciated with safety and securing a better future (Stewart
& Mulvey, 2014, p. 1033).
In traditional immigration and refugee-hosting coun-
tries, citizenship access among refugees has long been
discussed in relation to their allegiance or as a facilitat-
ing factor in integration processes. Similar to citizenship,
the concept of integration is also a controversial topic
since “there is no single generally accepted definition,
theory or model of immigrant and refugee integration”
(Castles, Korac, Vasta, & Vertovec, 2002, p. 112). At a
minimum, the concept of integration embodies certain
rights and adjustments of refugees (Strang & Ager, 2010).
Similarly, gaining citizenship can be regarded as a funda-
mental part of refugee integration, as it represents one
of the key structural factors of refugee integration, i.e.,
access to rights. Therefore, the path to citizenship for
refugees is considered one of the main stepping stones
towards integration (Ager & Strang, 2004, 2008). Ager
and Strang (2008) proposed a comprehensive approach
to integration by focusing on access to health services, la-
bor markets and education as well as the willingness of
migrants and refugees to be part of the receiving society.
The final stage of integration process is the acquisition
of citizenship, usually seen as a “reward” from a nation-
state to integrated refugees. However, the relationship
between refugee integration and citizenship is complex
and remains contested (Koska, 2015; Smyth, Stewart, &
Da Lomba, 2010; Stewart & Mulvey, 2014).
Citizenship and integration are indeed interrelated
concepts and their intricate relationship is not only influ-
enced by government policies, but also has an impact on
many political, economic and socio-cultural aspects of a
society. What is usually missing in these debates are the
refugees’ decisions in response to a given citizenship op-
portunity. In analyzing the role of citizenship in the inte-
gration processes of refugees, twodimensions of the con-
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cept of citizenship should be taken into account. The first
highlights the legal status that regulates one’s member-
ship in a state and the rights associated with this mem-
bership that are determined by governmental authority.
The other is related to the sense of identity and belong-
ing thatmembers of a particular polity associatewith the
new citizenship status (Koska, 2015). It is important to
recognize that refugees are not passive objects of such le-
gal structures, but rather active agentswhomake choices
between available legal structures (Turton, 2003, quoted
in Koska, 2015). For refugees, gaining citizenship mostly
means regaining freedom and mobility, having the abil-
ity to use the rights that come with this legal status, and
gaining access to power structures by ensuring their in-
clusion in a host society inwhich they feel safe and secure
(cf. Bloch, 2000; Morrell, 2009; Nunn, McMichael, Gif-
ford, & Correa-Velez, 2016; Vertovec, 2006). As argued
by Kibreab (2003), access to citizenship status revolves
around refugees’ decision whether to stay in the receiv-
ing country or not. Whether citizenship is understood as
the final stage of integration processes or forms the ba-
sis of integration by nation-states, for refugees, it simply
refers to safety, stability and acceptance by themembers
of receiving society.
For Syrians, the acquisition of Turkish citizenship
would provide a way to reach a safe legal status and sta-
bility, as they are under “temporary” protection and are
not even legally accepted as refugees. They are usually
facing “liminality”6 alongwith amyriad of problems such
as racism, discrimination, economic and social problems.
Consequently, the acquisition of Turkish citizenship is im-
portant for many Syrians, not only to reach safety and
attain “ontological security” (Giddens, 1991), but also
to have access to more legal employment opportunities
and be accepted by the wider society, thereby making
it possible to abandon their “liminal” state. In our study,
we realized that Syrian refugees also frequently opt for
dual citizenship or transnational citizenship, mainly to
gain rights and retain privileges in both contexts. The
next section will summarize the recent changes in the
Turkish citizenship regime and government policies. It
also underlines the main reasons why citizenship is used
as a reward for skilled and educated individuals, but also
serves as an essential tool towards integration, especially
in the case of Syrians.
3. The Changing Turkish Citizenship Regime
Apart from refugees’ attitudes towards citizenship, in-
creasing migration flows and life in heterogeneous soci-
eties have transformed nation-states and forced them to
replace earlier fixed concepts of citizenship with more
flexible re-definitions. Turkey is no exception. Recently,
Turkish authorities have duly accepted that Turkey has
become a destination country for migrants. With the
large number of refugees and migrants in its territory,
this has become even more evident after the arrival of
Syrians. In fact, Turkey started to make changes and re-
forms in migration policies not only to address pressing
issues resulting from the large number of flows over the
course of the past seven years, but also for the sake of the
EU Accession Process since the early 2000s. Other than
laws specifically addressing asylum issues (i.e., the LFIP
adopted in 2013 (Law No. 6458) and the Regulation on
Temporary Protection adopted in 2014), two laws are di-
rectly linked withmigration flows. The first one is the law
onwork permits for foreigners (No. 4817), whichwas put
into effect in 2003. The law mainly addresses the grow-
ing number of irregular and circular economic migrants
working in the informal sector who were attracted by
Turkey’s favorable economic position within the region.
Wage differentials compared to their countries of origin
is another factor in attracting labormigrants fromdiverse
locations, including Central Asia, Eastern Europe, Africa
and South Asia. Obviously, not only labor migrants but
also asylum seekers need to work to make ends meet.
Legal changes continuedwith the enactment of the Inter-
national Labor Force (Law No. 6735), which became the
primary legislation for foreign labor and replaced the ab-
rogated LawNo. 4817 as of 13 August 2016. The purpose
of the Lawwas to determine andmonitor a policy regard-
ing the international labor force and to extend work per-
mits according to certain criteria. The current legal frame-
work includes both employer-led and points-based ap-
proaches, with an emphasis on selective labor migration.
The introduction of the Turquoise Card is an indication of
this emphasis; it enables access to permanent work per-
mits for those considered of strategic importance, deter-
mined mainly by a high educational level, professional
experience, and investments in Turkey. It also extends
residence permits for the spouse and children of hold-
ers of Turquoise Cards. Because of this law, the LFIP was
amended on 29 October 2016 as well, with regard to res-
idence and work permits given to foreign students.7
The second significant recent legal change is to the
Turkish Citizenship Law. Turkish citizenship practice was
primarily based on the jus sanguinis principle, as deter-
mined under the Citizenship Law dated 1928 (No. 1312),
Law on Settlement (dated 1934, No. 2510), and Citi-
zenship Law dated 1964 (No. 403). Under this princi-
ple, descent (Turkish ethnicity) and heritage (Sunni Mus-
lims) play an important role in Turkish citizenship (Kirişçi,
2000). In an effort to address increasing trends in irregu-
lar migration, trafficking and fake intermarriages, Turkey
revised its citizenship laws in 2003 by creating a natural-
ization option for foreign nationals who meet certain cri-
teria. According to the Citizenship Law (No. 5901), mar-
rying a Turkish citizen made it possible for both men and
6 Liminality is a term coined by Van Gennep (1908) in analyzing rites of passage and was later elaborated on by Turner (1974). The liminal state of Syr-
ian refugees refers to the phase between separation (leaving Syria behind) and reincorporation (resettlement in a third country and/or acceptance
in Turkey). Their liminality also results from the temporary status given to Syrians in Turkey and it leaves them with a feeling of being neither here
nor there.
7 For amendments to the LFIP see DGMM (2016).
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women to acquire citizenship after three years of mar-
riage. In 2009, further changes were adopted, such as
providing protection for stateless children if they are un-
able to acquire their parents’ citizenship (No. 5901, Arti-
cle 11: 1),8 citizenship under exceptional circumstances
(Article 14: b), naturalization for adults if stateless and/or
after five years of uninterrupted residence in Turkey
and/or in possession of immoveable property in Turkey,
making investments in Turkey and transferring their work
place to Turkey (Article 15 (a)(b)(c) respectively), pend-
ing approval from the Council of Ministers (Article 21).9
These series of amendments de facto changed the cit-
izenship concept from one solely based on Turkish de-
scent, thus bringing Turkeymore in linewith immigration
countries of the world. Whilst opening pathways to reg-
ular migration, the Turkish citizenship law specifically de-
nies citizenship to refugees and asylum seekers as well as
those staying in Turkey illegally. Refugees in Turkey are
generally seen as temporary guests who should return
to their countries of origin whenever the reasons for dis-
placement cease to exist.
More recently, on December 12, 2016, another
amendment to the Turkish citizenship law was intro-
duced and accepted by the Council of Ministers and
signed by the President (Decision number: 2016/9601).
First of all, exceptional citizenship criteriawere described
in detail under Article 12 (paragraph 1b). These are:
1) making a capital investment of at least two million
USD in Turkey; 2) purchasing immovable property worth
at least one million USD; 3) securing employment for at
least 100 workers; 4) having at least three million USD or
equivalent deposits in Turkish banks, provided there are
no withdrawals for at least three years; and 5) keeping
government bonds and bills equaling at least three mil-
lion USD for three years. Other than the investment and
capital criteria, exceptional citizenship acquisition will be
made available to those who stay in the country legally
and have already contributed and/or have the potential
to contribute to the Turkish society in the fields of sci-
ence, economy, social life, sports, culture and arts. In line
with the changes, it seems apparent that Turkeywants to
attract more migrants with money and financial capacity
by offering them the chance to be naturalized.
According to a new report on Syrian refugees in
Turkey, published by the Turkish Parliament’s Refugee
Rights Sub-commission, more than 30,000 Syrian nation-
als had been granted citizenship in Turkey as of 2017
(Migration and Integration Report, 2018).10 Since thema-
jority of Syrians live in Istanbul, almost 80% of all Syrians
who gained Turkish citizenship recently also reside in Is-
tanbul. Another interesting point in this process is that
the government does not take applications at this point
for Turkish citizenship, but determines who could be nat-
uralized and gets in touch with them directly by call-
ing them for interviews. Before the individual interviews,
data obtained from the Health Ministry, Ministry of Ed-
ucation, Higher Education Board, Ministry of Labor and
Social Security, and DGGM are evaluated and analyzed
based on the following criteria: 1) Entering Turkey legally;
2) Staying under temporary protection and/or with a
valid residence permit; 3) Having higher education—an
undergraduate degree or above; 4) Having a profession;
and 5) Not being involved in any criminal activity.11 Al-
though a good command of Turkish language by candi-
dates is valued, it is not considered a sine qua non con-
dition. In line with the criteria of granting Turkish citizen-
ship, the initial evaluation process is carried out in con-
junction with the Department of Immigration and Direc-
torates of Population and Citizenship Affairs. Following
the evaluation process, interviews with prospective can-
didates take place. For accepted cases, forms are submit-
ted to the Council of Ministers for final approval.12
It is apparent that offering Turkish citizenship to Syr-
ians has come with the change in policies and an un-
derstanding that they are no longer “guests,” accepting
that most of them are going to stay in Turkey either long-
term or permanently. Therefore, we can say that the
shift in the Turkish citizenship law is a direct outcome of
recent migration flows. Although it might initially seem
that the top-down decision to grant Turkish citizenship
to Syrians was a simple political move by the governing
elite, it did not happen in a political vacuum only, but
depended heavily on social, economic and demographic
factors. As is, the Turkish citizenship regime can be re-
garded as a continuation of the age-old policy, as the law
still jealously guards criteria of ethnic descent and similar
culture. The Syrians in Turkey who are mostly Sunni Mus-
lims are considered “proper” migrants to be accepted
because of their similar religious background. Moreover,
almost one-third of Syrians already naturalized are re-
portedly either of Turkish descent, like Turkmen Syrians,
or married to Turkish nationals (Sputniknews, 2018). Yet,
other newly introduced criteria, such as having cultural
and economic capital, are in line with the demands of
the global economy and selective migration policies. Fol-
lowing the citizenship model of many countries in the
global North, like Canada and the United States, by giv-
ing priority to the skilled and educated, Turkey not only
8 See Howard (2017) for a detailed discussion on statelessness in Syrian refugee children.
9 These changes were put into effect as of 6 April 2010 after publication in the Official Gazette (Decision No. 2010/139) numbered 27544.
10 The number of Syrians who acquired Turkish citizenship could be as high as 40,000 by the end of 2017 and is expected to eventually include 300,000
Syrians (interview with senior DGMM official on 7 December 2017). There are also other reports stating that between 2011 and 2016, 7,827 Syrians
and 1,587 Iraqis obtained Turkish citizenship. See Turkish Interior Ministry’s statement at Ministry of Interior (2017). According to an earlier public
statement by the Directorate General on Population and Citizenship, the number of Syrians who earned Turkish citizenship between 2008 and 2013
was 3,577 while the number of Syrians who obtained Turkish citizenship throughmarriage to Turkish nationals by gender distribution was 839 men and
1,704 women.
11 According to the DGMM and Turkish National Security, the number of Syrians involved in criminal activities in Turkey is as low as 1.5%.
12 Interview with a senior DGMM official on 7 December 2017.
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seeks greater acceptance by local populations of natural-
ized Syrians, but also hopes to meet domestic demand
for skilled labor. If given proper jobs, the out-migration
pressures on the remaining skilled Syrians will also be
limited compared to previous years and can be utilized
for the long-term benefit of the country in ways such as
doing business with Syria and exerting soft power. More-
over, while giving citizenship to skilled and educated Syri-
ans, Turkey displays its willingness to engage them in the
integration processes of unskilled and uneducated Syri-
ans. Demographic concerns regarding the shrinking pop-
ulation of Turkey is another factor. Because of the de-
clining birthrates in Turkey, the country needs a young
population. Currently, the demographic trends of Syri-
ans in Turkey clearly suggest a young and dynamic pop-
ulation with 300 new babies born every day. Therefore,
in the Turkish case, citizenship is used both as a reward
for skilled individuals with economic and cultural capital
and as a tool for the integration of other Syrians. It also
demonstrates the other social, political anddemographic
concerns of the Turkish government.
4. Research Methods
The findings presented in this article are based on field-
work carried out in Istanbul and Gaziantep from Jan-
uary 2016 to December 2017, funded primarily by Koç
University College of Social Sciences and Humanities.
These two cities were selected for methodological rea-
sons, as each city hosts large populations of Syrians
and have historical experiencewith integratingmigrants.
We conducted in-depth interviews with a total of 45
Syrian refugees, including those who had already ac-
quired Turkish citizenship. Open-ended questionnaires
were designed to enable the respondents to tell their
stories in their ownwords, focusing primarily on theirmi-
gration trajectories, experiences in Turkey, near-future
plans and their thoughts about Turkish citizenship. We
used qualitative content analysis to identify a set of com-
mon themes from the narratives and then employed a
thematic coding system, which helped to create analyti-
cal categories. While we interviewed only one member
of the household, in some cases group discussions and
focus group interviews with Syrian women aged 18–45
and young gay men aged 18–27 enriched the interview
data. The interviews were conducted in public places,
such as cafes and restaurants, or other meeting points
like NGO offices, workplaces and private homes. The
length of stay of Syrian respondents in Turkey varied;
while somemigrated a year ago, others have been living
in Istanbul and/or Gaziantep for more than four years.
While the majority came to Turkey directly from Syria,
others came after living in Lebanon or Egypt. Secondary
migration within Turkey, especially to Istanbul, was also
prevalent among the respondent group despite the re-
strictions imposed. Although our respondent group can-
not be representative of the entire Syrian refugee pop-
ulation living in urban centers in Turkey, we made an
effort to choose people with different profiles based
on gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status and religion.
The majority of Syrians interviewed were under tempo-
rary protection but there were also others who were
staying in the country on residence permits. During the
in-depth interviews, we worked closely with an inter-
preter who translated from Arabic to Turkish. We also
conducted face-to-face interviews with 70 Turkish cit-
izens to gauge their perceptions of Syrians’ acquiring
Turkish citizenship. Ethical approval for the project was
gained via the university’s ethics committee; consent
forms were circulated to all participants before start-
ing the interview process. Other than Syrian and Turk-
ish respondents, we conducted interviews with some of
the local (Syrian and Turkish) civil society actors working
with Syrian populations as well as government officials
frommunicipalities in Gaziantep and Istanbul and at the
DGMM headquarters in Ankara.
5. The Views of Syrians Regarding Citizenship in Turkey
and Reactions by Local Populations
The majority of Syrian refugees in Turkey experience lim-
ited access to proper accommodations and jobs and face
problems of social and economic instability. Access to for-
mal employment is often problematic. In January 2016,
Turkey issued a new regulation allowing registered Syr-
ian refugees, including skilled workers, to apply for work
permits. Yet the number of Syrians with formal work per-
mits remains limited even to this day. There are also fur-
ther limitations on hiring Syrians: the number of Syrians
employed by Turkish companies cannot exceed 10% of
the total labor force and Syrians should have been in pos-
session of Turkish identification documents for at least
six months.13 For skilled and highly educated Syrians, de-
skilling and underemployment are common problems
in Turkey (see Erdoğan, 2014, pp. 29–30; Sunata, 2017,
pp. 5–6). Bloch (2004) argues that temporariness exac-
erbates the problems of refugees’ ability to access re-
sources, especially in the labormarket, and constructs an
obstacle to realizing longer term goals. Emphasizing that
the need to find proper employment for skilled people
should be a government priority instead of granting cit-
izenship, one respondent underlines that job insecurity
is the main reason for the departure of educated Syrians
from Turkey:
I hope educated Syrians do not leave Turkey anymore.
5,000 Syrian doctors went to Germany last year alone.
Turkey needs doctors and engineers but educated
people cannot work in Turkey. In Germany, they start
working immediately. Turkey should offer Syrians jobs,
not citizenship. (Sunni-Arab, 61, male, Gaziantep)
13 Turkish Ministry of Labor and Social Security data indicates that only 4,019 Syrian refugees were granted work permits in 2015. The numbers slightly
increased in 2016 reaching 13,298. See Ministry of Labor and Social Security (2015) and Al Jazeera (2016).
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Since 93%of all refugees and asylum seekers live in urban
centers or semi-urban areas in Turkey,14 it literally means
that in everyday life Syrian and Turkish nationals are in
close contact with each other, either in the poor neigh-
borhoods where they reside or in the workplace. While
there are immediate benefits to living in cities—support
of kinship networks, easier access to informal labor mar-
kets, healthcare, aid and cash assistance provided by in-
ternational organizations and local civil society actors—
there is also growing resentment, overt and covert racism,
exclusion and social problems in these urban areas. Turk-
ish public opinion and the reactions of local people to-
wards Syrian refugees show similarities to popular xeno-
phobic discourses aboutmigrants inmost countries, such
as “theywill take our jobs,” “the crime rate has increased,”
and “they will deplete our resources” (cf. Deniz, Ekinci,
& Hulur, 2016; Erdoğan, 2014; Öztürkler & Göksel, 2015;
Woods, Benvenuti, & Kayali, 2016). Our Turkish respon-
dents of varying socio-economic backgrounds also find
it troublesome to give citizenship to Syrians; some sug-
gested this should happen only if Syrian refugees meet
certain high standards. Some also voiced a belief that the
government would use Syrians with Turkish citizenship as
a voting block and raised concerns that the poor and un-
skilled would stay whereas the skilled would eventually
leave when the war was over:
The government should not have taken in too many
refugees. After so many years, our hospitality wears
out. Our own citizens have paid the price. Rents have
increased and it has becomedifficult to find jobs. They
[the government] brought them for political reasons,
mainly to get more votes. As a Kurd from Turkey, it
takes me longer to get a Turkish ID. Whatever rights
I have, they have even more. They [Syrians] should
not get Turkish citizenship. They will always put Syria
first. Theywill commit crimes. Other states are not tak-
ing them in. Why should Turkey? They will never go
back, there is nothing left in their country. (Kurdish,
55, male, Istanbul)
I believe Turkey has taken this citizenship decision in
a hasty manner, like all other issues regarding migra-
tion. The EU countries are not taking them [Syrians] in
large numbers, not because there is xenophobia, but
they have migration policies. The EU wants to accept
skilled people only and Europeans think about how to
integrate those refugees first. Turkey cannot meet all
their social and economic demands. When the war is
over, those with resources and property will go back
and the unskilled masses will be left in Turkey. (Turk-
ish, 58, female, Istanbul)
Anti-Syrian sentiment in Turkey increased in 2016 after
the cross-border intervention and loss of Turkish soldiers’
lives and again following the announcement that Syrian
refugees living in Turkey would be granted citizenship.
Other than recently occurring clashes between Syrian
and Turkish nationals in certain cities, some of the racist
discourse continues in various social media, including
Twitter under hashtags such as #suriyelilersınırdışıedilsin
(deport Syrians). Discrimination and violence against Syr-
ian refugees are reportedly on the rise in the border cities
of Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Kilis (Simsek, 2015) and have
spread to other cities, like Istanbul, Izmir, Sakarya and
Konya (see International Crisis Group, 2018, pp. 3–5). Our
Syrian respondents also acknowledged that they have be-
come the target of discriminatory remarks and unwel-
coming behaviors. The lack of language competence cre-
ates further barriers in establishing good relationships
withmembers of the receiving society, leaving themwith
a feeling of exclusion as stated in these excerpts:
A Turkish man tried to shoot me in front of our restau-
rant. He tried to kill me. He is a drunk guy, living on the
streets. Nobodywas hurt. The police came to take him
in, but the very next day he was on the streets again.
All eyes are on us. (Sunni-Arab, 35, male, Gaziantep)
We don’t have Turkish friends. The language is an im-
portant factor. Plus, we don’t share the same culture.
We are different. When I talk to a Turkish gay, he is
only into sex with me. He doesn’t care about what
I feel or try to be in a relationship. They also look
down on us as we are refugees. I find people ethno-
centric here. They have a prejudice against Syrians. If
I talk in Arabic on public transportation, they stare at
us. One day, a man shouted, “Go back to your country.
Our sons are fighting in Syria, but you are comfortable
here in Turkey.” (Syrian-Orthodox, 24, gay, Istanbul)
Regardless of the discriminatory attitudes they face,
many of our Syrian respondents stated that they prefer
to live in Turkey rather than in Europe. The main reasons
they choose to live in Turkey are its geographical and cul-
tural proximity to Syria, the political instability in Syria,
and a desire to maintain close links with their home-
land through business interactions. Xenophobia and anti-
immigrant sentiments in Europe, the perilous journeys
taken transiting Turkey, and the experiences of many Syr-
ian friends and relatives in Europe deterred them from
going further west. Today, the public, academia and pol-
icy circles have uniformly accepted that Syrians are going
to stay in Turkey much longer than initially expected. Of-
fering Turkish citizenship to Syrians, therefore, is part of
the change in migration policies and the understanding
that Syrians are not “guests” anymore. Returning to their
homeland is out of the picture for many, especially those
who lost everything in the civil war and those oppos-
ing the Asad regime. Repatriation occurs only when the
14 A total of 227,644, less than 7% of Syrians, stay in the 21 camps located in 10 provinces in Turkey; the remaining Syrians mainly live in border cities and
metropolitan areas, such as Istanbul, Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Gaziantep, Mersin, Adana, Bursa, Kilis, Izmir and Kahramanmaraş (information compiled from
DGGM, 2018).
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problems causing displacement are eliminated; these in-
clude lack of employment and markets, losing land and
property ownership, unavailability of schools and health
care, and inability to access clean water, housing, and
sanitation (Kibreab, 2003, p. 39). A Syrian Arab woman
in her late 30s working in a shop in Sultanbeyli, Istanbul
stated the reasons why she would like to stay in Turkey
even if she could not get Turkish citizenship:
We lost everything—our jobs, our house, our lives too.
I want to see my children grow up in peace—that’s
all I care about. We lived a horrible experience. There
was death everywhere. You simply walk on dead peo-
ple. You smell death everywhere. The streetswere like
rivers of blood. I could not forget that.We are grateful
to Turkey. Oil-rich Muslim countries shut their doors.
Europe shuts the door. Return? I don’t have anything
there. Why should I go back? For what? No house, no
job, no money to fix anything. Our memories are lost.
Our lives are lost. They [Asad forces] not only ruined
our houses but our idea of home. Turkey is like Syria,
the same religion. I don’t expect that they will make
me a Turkish citizen. I am not a doctor, I am not an
engineer. But I am happy here without being a citizen.
Turkey is my home already. I feel that. (Sunni-Arab, 37,
female, Istanbul)
Others withmore resources also suggest that amix of so-
cial and political problems impede their will to return to
Syria for good:
The future for Syria is not very promising. Even when
the war is over, it will become worse. We need strong
leaders to keep the country united. Nobody trusts
the Asad regime anymore. Stories in Syria are horri-
ble. What Asad has done to his own country is with-
out comparison and unprecedented in history. (Sunni-
Arab, 61, male, Gaziantep)
Most of our Syrian participants are in favor of obtain-
ing citizenship in Turkey on the condition that they are
able to keep their Syrian citizenship.15 Transnational cit-
izenship supports the relationships between individu-
als in two or more independent states and highlights
membership-based rights and obligations (Bauböck,
2007). Our respondents mainly opt for dual citizenship
as they do not want to cut their symbolic and economic
ties with Syria:
I do notwant to leavemy Syrian citizenship. I was born
and grew up in Syria. I have worked in Syria andwould
like to get my pension from Syria. (Syrian-Turkmen,
male, 54, Gaziantep)
I want Turkish citizenship very much for myself and
for my son. Only then I will not feel different. I will be
like other Turks. No one can use me, and I will have
the same rights. My son is stateless as his father was
Palestinian. But I cannot leave Syrian citizenship. Syria
is my homeland. (Sunni-Arab, 50, female, Istanbul)
The respondents above highlighted the need to be mo-
bile and the importance of not losing the rights that
Syrian citizenship offers them. Their determination to
retain dual citizenship validates the statement that cit-
izenship is no longer an issue of nationality, but repre-
sents “the political mechanisms that make people into
citizenswhich takes account of access to equal rights, the
needs, interests and values of citizens as members of so-
cial and cultural collectivities” (Castles & Davidson, 2000,
p. 24). Citizenship further represents safety and security
for most refugees, rather than only facilitating their in-
tegration process (Morrell, 2009). Having access to citi-
zenship also confers “normalcy” and access to rights for
many Syrians, as their temporary protection status does
not guarantee permanent protection and most of them
have lost their hope that thewar in Syria would end soon.
While doing fieldwork, we also met Syrians who have al-
ready acquired Turkish citizenship. They also mentioned
that despite earning Turkish citizenship, they would like
to go back for different reasons:
Vatan [the motherland] is where I was born. Having
a nationality is not enough, you need to have rights
in your country. My wife earned Turkish citizenship
through her mother. Therefore, our children also re-
ceived Turkish citizenship. I was not interested in hav-
ing Turkish citizenship at first. Before 2012, I was do-
ing business with a Turkish medical company while in
Syria. Asad forces arrested me at the airport. After 9–
10 days, they setme free. Then I applied for Turkish cit-
izenship. I had an interview at the Turkish Consulate in
Aleppo. Depending on the political situation after the
war, I want to go back to Syria. I am a member of the
opposition party. (Sunni-Arab, 45, male, Gaziantep)
I became Turkish citizen in May 2016 with the rest
of my family and my eight brothers living in Turkey.
Our whole village got citizenship. Our ancestors were
Ottoman soldiers and some of our family members
stayed in Turkey while we stayed in Syria. We feel
more secure now and protected by law. But most
[Turkish] people think I am still a Syrian. Then I show
them my kimlik [Turkish ID card]. Now as a Turkish
citizen, I have to pay for healthcare and I cannot get
cash assistance for education formy kids from interna-
tional organizations. Plus, I cannot have a second wife
in Turkey! As Turkmens, we also have a responsibility
to go back to Syria and maintain our existence there.
(Syrian-Turkmen, 43, male, Gaziantep)
15 This is also in line with another qualitative study larger in scale carried out in 10 cities in Turkey in which 74% of respondents showed an interest in
Turkish citizenship. See report released by the Human Development Foundation (Sunata, 2017).
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These quotes show that citizenship is not associated
with a sense of national belonging anymore, especially
in the case of Syrian refugees. It instead represents a sta-
tus which provides protection and access to rights rather
than signifying emotional links. In their case, citizenship
does not immediately guarantee inclusion in Turkish so-
ciety, but is an ongoing process. The meaning refugees
give to citizenship, their decision-making processes and
active participation supports new practices of citizenship
which refer to safety, acceptance by thewider society, ac-
cess to rights and a multiplicity of memberships.
6. Conclusion
This article has presented findings on acquiring Turkish
citizenship, both from the perspective of Syrian refugees
and Turkish nationals while analyzing the reasons for
changes in citizenship policy from the perspective of the
Turkish state. As illustrated by the empirical data, Syr-
ian refugees in Turkey are in favor of dual citizenship be-
cause of access to rights in both countries, increasedmo-
bility, retirement options, and business opportunities in
two countries. We suggest that the reasons for the pref-
erence of dual citizenship do not only reflect feelings of
national belonging, but also highlight the importance of
guarding civil, political and economic rights in both coun-
tries, thus having more life choices.
Through the use of different regulations, polities
have always tried to determine who can be included as
a citizen and who should be excluded (Heyman, 2018,
p. 45). In the Turkish case, the dramatic shift in the un-
derstanding of citizenship and the recent inclusion of pre-
viously excluded groups, like migrants, have taken place
due to mass migration flows and the pressures to suc-
cessfully integrate migrants into Turkish society. Policy
changes further reflect the necessity of reconciling the
need to integrate the Syrian population with the need to
facilitate their acceptance by the host society amidst ris-
ing tensions in manymajor cities in Turkey. Demographic
concerns regarding the shrinking population of Turkey
and political factors, such as the fear of losing all quali-
fied Syrians to the West and the possible backlash if un-
skilled masses are given citizenship, are other important
drivers of these policy changes.
However, as stated by Heyman, “citizenship is not
only inclusive but also exclusive, giving rise to social
boundaries of insider and outsider” (2018, p. 46). One
big question is what will happen to the vast majority
of Syrians who will not be given Turkish citizenship? It
seems that many Turkish people (86.2%), regardless of
their political affiliations and voting behavior, are united
in their wish for the repatriation of Syrians once the war
is over.16 In our interviews, we also found that Turkish
nationals had no affinity towards Syrian culture despite
a common Islamic heritage, whereas for Syrians, the cul-
tural similarity to Turks and proximity to their homeland
were cited as major reasons for their wish to stay in
Turkey. Nowadays, due to public perceptions and the up-
coming 2019 presidential elections in Turkey, official dis-
course has taken the form of the eventual safe return of
Syrian refugees and providing a safe zone for returnees,
as Turkey cannot keep Syrians within its territory forever
(Hürriyet, 2018). So far, 130,000 Syrians have returned
to Syria after a safe zone inside Syria was secured in the
wake of the “Euphrates Shield” Operation. An ongoing
military operation named “Olive Branch” was launched
across Turkey’s borders in yet another attempt to provide
a safe area that can facilitate repatriation after clearing
the area from Kurdish separatist groups. Yet, numerous
reports and our study alike suggest that a mass return is
unlikely given the social, economic and political situation
in Syria.17
Another question is whether granting citizenship will
ensure Syrians’ integration in Turkish society. There is ev-
idence that skilled and educated individuals have more
cultural and social capital to integrate. Moreover, they
are usually more equipped in claims-making. But, as we
have seen in the UK, France, Belgium, and Germany, citi-
zenship alone is not enough to foster integration or elim-
inate discrimination and social exclusion in society. In-
tegration policies for refugees and natives alike are ur-
gently needed, in addition to good governance in migra-
tionmanagement and the provision of direct financial as-
sistance to local administrations that have been proven
to play a pioneering role in integration. The Sultanbeyli
and Esenler Municipalities in Istanbul and the Gaziantep
Metropolitan Municipality have been doing impeccable
work in terms of integration since 2014. Turkey followed
an open-door policy until 2017 and indeed adopted a
very humanitarian and compassionate approach towards
Syrian refugees, spending almost 30 billion USD and re-
ceiving limited funds of around 900million Euro to allevi-
ate some of the burden. There is still much to be done in
termsof the education of Syrian children andprovision of
employment. The schooling ratio of Syrian children has
tremendously increased from 30% in 2015–16 to 62% in
2017–18 school year (International Crisis Group, 2018,
p. 18). The remaining 38% are currently out of school and
should serve as an alarm signal of lost generations and
delinquency. As for employment, the number of Syrians
with access to decent jobs is still very limited. Although
there are 8,000 to 10,000 registered Syrian businesses
operating in Turkey, and the number of Syrians legally
employed increased to almost 20,000 as of early 2018, it
is estimated that almost onemillion Syrians are currently
employed in the informal sectorwithminimal pay and no
social security (International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 17).
The rhetoric surrounding “ensar-muhajir” allowed
many faith-based civil society actors to actively work
to extend humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees out of
16 Initial results of the survey titled “Dimensions of Polarization in Turkey” conducted by the German Marshall Fund and Istanbul Bilgi University Centre
for Migration Research (Centre for Migration Research, 2018). See also Turkish Daily News (2018).
17 See, for example, International Crisis Group (2018, p. 22) and Kirişçi & Ferris (2015).
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an Islamic duty towards co-religionists. As recently men-
tioned by Turkish Prime Minister, Binali Yıldırım, at the
Symposium on Migration and Integration on 15 Decem-
ber 2017 in Ankara:
Assimilation policy does not exist in our belief system,
in our culture and in our state traditions. Our rela-
tionship with refugees was based on muhajir and en-
sar. The main duty of migrants is to integrate with
the [Turkish] society and to obey the laws. One thing
we cannot tolerate is migrants disregarding this coun-
try’s values.18
Yet, it is high time to discard this discourse and focus on
a rights-based approach instead. No matter how citizen-
ship is defined, it confers civil, social, cultural and eco-
nomic rights. It is clear that Turkey cannot be expected
to give citizenship to all Syrians living in Turkey. Giving
them permanent residence, however, could be one way
to ensure social inclusion. In any case, a well-structured
integration policy is needed to safeguard the rights given
to refugees and should be fully implemented. Otherwise,
the current social problems and ongoing resentment to-
wards Syrians will only accelerate. As we write this ar-
ticle, a National Integration Plan is underway and is ex-
pected to covermajor areas like employment, education,
healthcare and the elimination of discrimination.19 Nev-
ertheless, it is almost certain that the integration of Syr-
ian refugees will be among the top three agenda items
in Turkey in the coming years.
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